The rise of the Big Tech has led to new questions of law in the field of competition across the globe (Wang, 2017). From determining ‘winner takes all’ strategy to providing a level and just playfield to the economic market players, the regulators have experimented with multiple approaches – from enacting new legislations to enforcing the existing competition legal framework – to better regulate the given sector by assessing the conduct of the economic entities, as well as of the end-consumers (Fox, 2014).
Few of the questions which have been recurrent in appearing for the resolution include determination of ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ trade practices in the digital markets, possible ‘conflict of interest’ for the entities which act both as the player, as well as the platform, and counting reasonable profit-margin for the Big Tech entities wherever services from other intermediaries are involved, among many (Khan, 2019). An overarching question to this discussion has been how Big Tech companies collect user-data, and the subsequent approach adopted by the regulators to scrutinize such a conduct. A major part of this process also revolves around delineating the ‘relevant market’ and imposition of excessive/predatory pricing, if any.
The said research is an attempt to study the competition landscape in the digital markets, and assess the conduct of Big Tech companies in line with the enactment of various antitrust statutes. The research would particularly focus on the search results produced by the search engines and app stores to understand if there is any chance of bias in the system for certain products, and how does it adversely affects the larger economic and democratic setup in the best interests of consumer welfare. The study, in order to generate such an evidence, would rely on both primary and secondary researches to form a holistic understanding, thereby assisting both the reader, as well as legislator, in better regulation and policy formulation.
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